Реферат: Stanley Bruce's great industrial relation blunder
Реферат: Stanley Bruce's great industrial relation blunder
STANLEY BRUCE'S GREAT INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
BLUNDER
The Howard government and its conservative backers are preparing
with considerable fanfare for an assault on the trade unions through so-called
reform of the industrial relations system after Howard gets control of the Senate
on June 31.
This raises the issue of how the reactionary proposals of the
Liberals can be defeated, as the labour movement faces these attacks in a rather
defensive situation.
People who think there will be a massive groundswell of immediate
industrial rebellion against these proposals are deluding themselves. The labour
movement at the moment is rather battered and dispirited.
The traditional socialist slogans of mobilization are still necessary
and appropriate, but it's extremely important to conduct a rapid educational program
in the labour movement about the dangers of the conservative industrial proposals
and about historical precedents.
A campaign for a militant industrial response has to be combined
with exploring all the legal possibilities for defeating the Liberal offensive.
Rhetoric about industrial mobilisation, on its own, won't get very far.
It's also necessary to construct the broadest united front, including
the bureaucracies in the labour movement, whose interests are threatened to some
extent, and state Labor governments, whose traditional prerogatives are threatened.
The Liberals have a tall order before them, legally. They're
talking about using aspects of corporations law to grab control of state industrial
systems, forcing most industrial matters into the federal sphere and then abolishing
most of the functions of the state systems.
Legally, that is a high-risk strategy. Even the current conservative-dominated
High Court is likely to reject such proposals if they're strenuously opposed by
the states.
A big danger in this situation is left talk by sections of the
union bureaucracy and state Labor governments about handing over the state systems
to the federal government on traditional Labor centralist grounds.
Such moves should be strenuously resisted. The striking thing
about the Liberals' proposals is that they are an extraordinary rerun of the policies
of the Bruce-Page conservative government in 1926 and 1928-29, which were defeated
firstly in a referendum in 1926 and finally by the electoral defeat of the Bruce-Page
government in 1929.
In some ways the social circumstances of the late 1920s were similar
to now. The labour movement was in a relatively defensive situation and the economy
was in a relative boom.
The political situation in the labour movement was quite similar
too, with Matt Charlton, the federal parliamentary leader, supporting the transfer
of industrial powers to the federal sphere, rather like Gough Whitlam did more
recently.
The major difference is that in the late 1920s there was quite
a bit of conflict on the conservative side about the proposals, with the turbulent
figure of Billy Hughes opposing Bruce every inch of the way. There doesn't seem
to be the same scale of dissent on the conservative side in current conditions.
The most recent example of successful industrial resistance to
conservative attack is the struggle of the Maritime Union a few years ago. That
was a classic agitation combining industrial militancy, community mobilisation and
the intelligent exploitation of every legal mechanism, which largely contributed
to achieving the desired outcome: the preservation of the MUA.
In Jack Lang's useful memoir, The Great Bust, which was largely
ghost-written by Norm Macauley, there is a useful account of the Bruce-Page government's
failed attempt to do what the Howard government is hoping to do. The two relevant
chapters are available below to assist the beginnings of a discussion, which will
have to take place pretty fast if the next few months are to be used to prepare
for mobilisation.
Imagine a referendum in which every political leader in the Commonwealth
was rejected in his own sphere of influence. That was what happened in Australia
on September 4th, 1926. No one escaped the axe. It was a referendum to hand over
industrial powers to the Commonwealth, and to provide limited powers over trusts
and combines. Prime Minister Bruce sponsored the proposal. He was not only defeated
throughout Australia but in his own state of Victoria as well. The federal leader
of the Labor opposition, Matt Charlton, supported Bruce. He also had his advice
rejected throughout the Commonwealth and couldn't even carry his own electorate
of Hunter.
As Premier of New South Wales I advocated a no vote. But this
state voted yes. T.R. Bavin, who was leader of the Nationalist opposition, also
advocated a no vote, but his state electorate of Gordon gave an emphatic yes vote.
Mick Bruxner, Dave Drummond, Frank Chaffey and other prominent members of the state
opposition, were against increased federal powers and met the same fate.
E.G. Theodore was premier of Queensland, and also was on the
no side, only to have his state vote yes. Scullin, Latham, W.M. Hughes, Frank
Brennan and Dr Maloney were all on the losing side.
If anyone wants to study the referendum device to prove just
how unpredictable public opinion can be, and how difficult it is to carry a referendum,
this vote provides a classic study. I have opposed every referendum since the first
conscription referendum. Although the Labor platform provided for unification, I
was always a federalist. I believed that the sovereign states had very real functions.
The Commonwealth was always trying to filch them.
The state of New South Wales was always in the vanguard of social
reform. We were many steps ahead of the other states. Many of the referenda were
inspired by the hope of taking over control of our affairs, in order to deprive
the people of this state of hard-won gains. That was precisely why Bruce introduced
his referendum proposals in June 1926.
My government had passed a 44-Hour Week Act, which provided for
a working day of eight hours, and a 51/2 day week. Instead of leaving the question
to the courts, we had introduced it by legislation. The Tories were hostile. They
said we were ruining the state. Industries would transfer to other states. We also
introduced compulsory workers' compensation, a new factories act, the widows' pension
and had motherhood endowment ready for Parliament. The Tories were in a panic.
Bruce had just swept the country in his law-and-order election
and believed that he had a mandate to deal with the trade unions. The Crimes Act
had been the first step only. He wanted to introduce compulsory ballots for trade
unions. He also wanted power to bolster up the Crimes Act. There were still grave
doubts as to whether it was constitutional.
In the 44-Hour Act, we inserted a provision that it applied to
all workers within the state, whether they worked under federal or state awards.
The employers, through the Clyde Engineering Company, Lever Bros and Metters, took
the case to the High Court. It is known in the law books as the Cowburn and Amalgamated
Engineers' Union case. By four to two the High Court ruled that federal awards
prevailed over all state awards, as did federal laws over state where the Commonwealth
has jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Sir Adrian Knox, Sir Isaac Isaacs, and Justices
Rich and Starke upheld the federal power. Messrs Justices Higgins and Powers, both
well versed in industrial law, had the opposite viewpoint.
After studying the judgment, the Bruce-Page Cabinet decided
they could stymie the 44-hour week right away if they could obtain full power over
industrial matters for the Commonwealth. Only New South Wales and Queensland had
the 44-hour week.
They appointed a Commonwealth Arbitration Court of three judges
– Chief Justice Lukin, and Justices Dethridge and Beeby. They were given appointments
for life at £2500 a year. The next move was to get the question of hours and
wages transferred to their court.
Bruce and his Attorney-General, J.G. Latham, decided that the
time was opportune for a referendum to increase Commonwealth powers. One of their
problems was that a Nationalist Party conference in 1923 had voted in favor of
limiting Commonwealth powers and transferring them back to the states. But that
didn't worry Bruce. He had just obtained a fresh mandate. Most of the states had
returned Labor governments. In a speech to a select gathering at the Hotel Australia,
presided over by Sir Owen Cox, Bruce, shortly after he had become Prime Minister,
had suggested what was really needed in this country was a "dictatorship of
six of the best brains of the land".
Bruce knew that the Federal Labor Party had always favored unification.
Fisher had put a referendum to the people in 1911 and 1913, which had suggested
alterations to the constitution giving the federal government absolute power over
all industrial problems, trusts and monopolies and other items in the Labor platform.
They had been rejected on both occasions, with New South Wales leading the opposition.
Hughes tried again in 1919 with proposals covering trade and commerce, as well as
arbitration, together with power to nationalise monopolies. Again the Australian
people had turned their thumbs down and nowhere more emphatically than in this state.
Bruce's trump card was to invite Charlton and the federal Labor
Party to confer with him on proposals which they could jointly submit to the people.
The Federal Caucus referred the suggestion to the state branches of the ALP.
Three states were in favor of collaboration while three were against. Again New
South Wales opposed the suggestion. Charlton then decided that he would go ahead.
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